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MARK W.

JANIS*

The Recognition and Enforcement

of Foreign Law: The Antelope's
Penal Law Exceptiont
I. Introduction
In 1825, Chief Justice Marshall held in The Antelope that "(t)he courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another."' Since then, United States
Courts have painstakingly crafted a variety of definitions of the word
"penal" in order to help determine when and when not they should apply
foreign laws or execute foreign judgments which conceivably might be
characterized as "penal." Much of their hairsplitting analysis might have
been avoided if American judges and commentators had looked behind
Marshall's phrase to see its foundations in law and policy.
After reviewing the accepted wisdom about The Antelope's penal law
exception, this article looks at the exception in context. Drawing upon the
cases argued by counsel, the article argues that Marshall did not frame the
exception with any unelaborated definition of "penal law" in mind. Rather,
Marshall sought to restrain the courts from infringing upon another state's
sovereign authority, especially when what was at issue was a state's right to
benefit by the execution of its public law.
II. Accepted Wisdom about The Antelope
American commentators have failed to alert the courts to the origins of
*Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Professor Janis also serves as
Chairman of the Section's Committee on the Law of the Sea.
tThis article, though largely historical, was generated for a modern and practical enterprise:
the work of The International Law Association (American Branch) Committee on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Public Law, on which the author serves.
1. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) [hereinafter cited as "The Antelope"].
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The Antelope's penal law exception because they have assumed, incorrectly,
that Marshall more or less plucked the term out of thin air. The academic
error goes back to an otherwise commendable article by Professor Leflar. 2
In fairness to Leflar, it must be noted that his article treated the origins of the
rule only in scholarly dictum.
Leflar's central aim was to make and substantiate his basic and often-cited
proposition that it was a mistake for judges to extend Marshall's penal law
exception to "new sets of facts to which the reason for the rule, assuming
that there is a reason for it, has no relation." ' 3 Leflar willingly accepted the
application of the rule to truly criminal laws, but one-by-one he showed how
non-criminal extensions of the rule, e.g. to wrongful death acts, exemplary
damages on tort claims, personal liability upon officers, directors and shareholders for corporate debts, usury laws, and tax claims, were not justified by
what he thought the only two good justifications for the penal law exception:
local public policy and forum non conveniens.4 Fundamentally, Leflar preferred those decided cases which followed Huntington v. Atrill 5 and restricted "the definition of 'penal' to the particular conflict of laws point in
issue, and in effect says that the statute or other rule of law is 'penal in the
international sense' only if it prescribes punishment at the instance of the
state or its representatives for violation of the criminal law as such." '
Leflar's article is by now somewhat dated, not only by a new half century's
case law, but also by his then justifiable assumption that states could not or
would not provide for extraterritorial personal jurisdiction. Without longarm statutes, when foreign states refused to apply a state's law in noncriminal cases, a potential defendant could avoid the application of a state's
"penal" laws simply by leaving its territory.7 Extradition, available for
criminal offenses, was of course then and now unavailable for the prosecu8
tion of civil cases.
It was only in passing, early on in his article, that Leflar described the
origins of The Antelope's rule:
American cases searching for authority to support their exclusion seldom go
back further than Chief Justice Marshall's part of a sentence in The Antelope:
"'The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.
... Indeed. there
is not much to be found further back. There were two earlier cases in which
English courts refused to give effect to statutes of nations at war with England
taking away the property of Englishmen because of their nationality, the English
2. Leflar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims," 46 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1932) [hereinafter cited as "Leflar"].
3. Id., at 196.
4. Id., at 206-225.
5. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
6. Leflar, supra note 2, at 204.
7. Id., at 193, 200-201.
8. Id., at 200-201.
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courts saying quite correctly and with an altogether inescapable nationalist attitude that they must refuse to enforce such foreign penal statutes. Of course they
could as well have spoken of local public policy, and have reached the same result
as surely. When Chief Justice Marshall wrote his oft-repeated eleven words in
1825. he did not refer to the earlier cases, nor to any other reason or authority: nor
did he define his word "penal." Insofar as "penal" is a synonym for "criminal."
and that would seem to be the sense in which the word was used, citation of
authority was needless. In the common law it had long been understood that acts
were punished as crimes only by the state or nation whose laws were violated.'
As is explored below, Leflar's paragraph on the origins of the penal law
exception in American law left a great deal to be desired. Nonetheless,
Leflar's notions have become the accepted wisdom. Thomas Stoel cited
Leflar and wrote "Marshall gave no explanation of his remark and American courts since have almost all been content to quote Marshall and seek no
further." "' Professor Kutner cited Leflar and Stoel for his proposition that
the penal law exception was "of doubtful origin.-'' The Scoles & Hay
hornbook on conflict of laws cited to Leflar for "what must be regarded as
the best analysis of the American origins of [the] rule" and averred that
Marshall's statement was "perhaps dictum even in the case in which it was
made."1 2 While all these commentators are right in saying that the penal law
exception should not be applied, as it so often is, mechanically and unthinkingly, they do not do justice to Marshall. Actually, the scholarly criticisms of
the mechanical application of the penal law exception are buttressed by the
original, though now seemingly forgotten, foundations of Marshall's holding in The Antelope.
III. The Antelope in Context
Leflar's article mentioned "two earlier cases" which refused to enforce
foreign statutes penalizing Englishmen because of their nationality.1 3 His
reference was to Folliott v. Ogden, 14 and to Wolff v. Oxholm,' 5 cases
involving American and Danish confiscation statutes. As the commentators
repeat, Marshall neither cited these cases nor any others for his exception. A
reading of the entire reported case of The Antelope, however, indicates that
the Supreme Court had not been looking at the confiscatory statute cases
mentioned by Leflar. Rather, Marshall had been directed by counsel to
quite a number of English and American cases concerning the slave trade.
9. Id., at 195.
10. Stoel. "The Enforcement of Foreign Non-Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in

England and the United States." 16 INT'L & COMP. L. (. 663. 665 (1967).
11. Kutner. Judicial Identification of" Penal Laws" in the Conflict of'Laws. 31 OKLA. L. Rrv.
590 (1978).
12. E. F. Scoles & P. Hay. Conflict of Laws 943 (1982).
13. Leflar. supra note 2. at 195.
14. 1 H.B. 123 (1789). aff'd Ogden v. Folliott. 3 T.R. 720 (17901). 4 Bro. P.C. 111 (1792).
15. 6 M. & S. 99 (1817).
WINTER 1986
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The vital issue in The Antelope was whether slaves aboard vessels seized
on the high seas by United States warships should be returned to Spanish
and Portugese slave traders. Mr. Key. counsel for the United States, argued
that the slave trade "is now condemned by the general consent of nations.
who have publicly and solemnly declared it to be unjust, inhuman, and
illegal."1 Mr. Berrien for Spain and Portugal thought that neither slavery
nor the slave trade were yet illegal and that as a slave-holding nation, it was
unbecoming of the United States "to assume to themselves the character of
censors of the morals of the world." 17 For the slave trade substitute torture
and one finds a modern parallel to this debate when comparing Filartigav.
Pena-lralaIX to Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 19 To substantiate their opinions in The Antelope. opposing counsel cited, inter alia, The
Amedie, The Fortuna, The Donna Marianna, The Louis, Madrazo v. Willes,
La Jeune Eugenie, The Diana, and Butts v. Pen. 21' Never did counsel cite,
insofar as the report of the case records. Leflar's Folliottv. Ogden or Wolff v.
Oxholm.
The penal law exception arose in The Antelope decision after Marshall
had concluded that though slavery and the slave trade might violate the law
of nature, they did not offend the positive law of nations. 2' Counsel for the
United States had argued that Spain and Portugal were nations which had
made formal declarations against the slave trade. 2 Could the United States
enforce a prohibition against the slave trade against nationals of countries
on record as opposing that trade? Marshall answered no: '[als no nation can
23
prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations."Could, though, it be said that the United States was not making or
enforcing a rule of the law of nations but simply recognizing and enforcing
Spanish and Portugese law? No again: "the right of bringing in for adjudication in time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has
prohibited the trade cannot exist. "24 Then follows the famous
line: "[t]he
2
courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." 5
Though Marshall did not cite it at this place in his decision. The Louis was
the case referred to at this stage of the argument by both counsel for the
United States and that for Spain and Portugal. 2' In The Louis Sir William
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 76-77.
Id., at 86.
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The Antelope, supra note 1, at 70-114.
Id., at 114-122.
Id., at 79-80.
Id., at 122.
Id.,at 122-123.
Id., at 123.
Id., at 79-80, 98-99.
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Scott reversed a lower court's condemnation of a French ship engaged in the
slave trade. 27 Respecting the recognition and enforcement of foreign public
law the crucial passage is:
It is pressed as a difficulty, what is to be done. if a French ship laden with slaves
for a French port is brought in? I answer without hesitation, restore the possession
which has been unlawfully divested: -rescind the illegal act done by your own
subject: and leave the foreigner to the justice of his own country. What evil
follows? If the laws of France do not prohibit, you admit that condemnation
cannot take place in a British Court. But if the law of France be what you contend.
what would have followed upon its arrival at Martinique, the port whither it was
bound'? That all the penalties of the French law would have been immediately
thundered upon it. If your case be true, there will be no failure of justice. Why is
the British judge to intrude himself insubsidium juris, when everything requisite
will be performed in the French Court in a legal and effectual manner? Why is the
British judge, professing, as he does, to apply the French law. to assume cognisance for the mere purpose of directing that the penalties shall go to the British
Crown and its subjects. which that law has appropriated to the French Crown and
its subjects, thereby combining, in one act of this usurped authority,
an aggression
28
upon French property as well as upon French jurisdiction?
Scott's opinion in The Louis provides background that helps make Marshall's penal law exception in The Antelope explicable. The objection to
applying foreign law condemning the vessel rested not. as in Leflar's two
confiscation cases, on a public policy protection of local citizens, but in a
reluctance to infringe upon the sovereign authority of the foreign state.
What established the infringement in both The Louis and The Antelope was
that the adjudicating state was also the confiscating state. Scott explicitly
objected to ' a result where "the penalties shall go to the British Crown and its
subjects.""
Marshall's "oft-repeated eleven words," 3" make very good sense when
they are read in context against counsels' arguments in The Antelope and
Scott's opinion in The Louis. The penal law exception as framed in The
Antelope had little or nothing to do with Leflar's suggested precedents
protecting local citizens. Rather, Marshall in The Antelope based his exception on slave trading cases which called for a deference to the jurisdiction of
foreign sovereigns. Such deference echoed The Schooner Exchange where
Marshall underlined the "perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns." 3 1 In The Antelope Spain and Portugal appeared, as had France
in The Schooner Exchange, to contest the jurisdiction of the United States.
Marshall refused to allow the U.S. to use foreign law as a justification for

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

2 Dods. 210, 165 Eng. Reports 1464 (1817).
Id.. at 1479.
Id.
Leflar. supra note 2. at 195.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch, 116, 137) (1812).
WINTER 1986
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confiscating the slaves aboard the Spanish and Portugese vessels. To do so
would plainly offend Spain and Portugal. Following The Louis, Marshall left
the public benefit of any confiscation to the foreign state.
IV. Conclusion
There is, therefore, less difficulty than Leflar and others have supposed in
reconciling The Antelope with the other principal United States case on the
penal law exception to the recognition and enforcement of foreign public
laws. Huntington v. Attrill, 2 held that in English and American law "penal
law" was meant only to encompass cases involving "punishment for an
offense committed against the State, and which, by the English and Ameri' 33
can constitutions, the executive of the State has the power to pardon.
Thus, -[t]he question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects
may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of
the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful
act." 34 Huntington's emphasis upon the public versus private character of
the act is quite consistent with The Antelope. In The Antelope it was the
public benefit of the remedy, confiscation, that was the crucial element in
the decision not to recognize and enforce the foreign statute.

32. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
33. Id., at 667.
34. Id., at 673-74.
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